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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the principal-agent model of executive compensation through an empirical 
study of the interaction between CEO compensation and firm performance. As a multi level 
regression analysis that specifically shows the weight of the variance of the main independent 
variable, above and over the other independent variables, the stepwise multiple regression is 
employed to induce a statistical model of the pay-performance sensitivity. The stepwise multiple 
regression offers insights into the different weight assigned to the performance measure. In this 
respect, variances of the variables related to the change in the market value of firms are 
specifically weighted against each other in order to determine specific characteristics of the pay-
performance relationship. The analysis is consistent with the agency theory that firm’ executives 
take advantage of the lack of control by firms’ owners to pursuit their personal interests. As the 
United States’ economy tumbles, the change in CEO total compensation does not seem to follow 
the accounting criteria of performance measures typically specified in management compensation 
contracts. The study reveals a lack of relationship between CEO compensation and firm 
performance. The link running from the change in the market value of firms and the change in 
CEO total compensation is flawed. The incentives faced by shareholders to discipline executives 
would be able to increase the performance of firms. It would be absurd for the compensation 
committee to rely on the single firms’ total assets value as the performance measure of CEO 
compensation. Other performance vehicles, such as returns, earnings, and cash flows should be 
considered in the determination of executive compensation.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he agency theory states that the absence of control by firms’ owners (principals) results in managers’ 
of firms (agents) taking advantage of their positions to obtain personal benefits (Ueng, Wells, and 
Lilly, 2000). Also called the principal-agent model of executive compensation, insights of the agency 
theory are used to enrich the pay-performance sensitivity that relates executives’ pay to the performance of firms. 
The agency theory recommends that firms should set up a system of compensation policies that align executives’ 
pay with firms’ performance measures. Under this system, the development of a compensation plan should tie the 
interests of firms’ executives to the ones of the owners of firms. The proposed study links CEO total compensation 
to firm performance as an attempt to help compensation committees determine the optimal remuneration of firms’ 
executives. The model empirically relates the change in CEO total compensation to the change in the market value 
of firms; more especially, this paper examines whether the change in executives’ compensation contracts is related 
to the change in compensation vehicles such as returns, cash flows, earnings, and assets. 
  
PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
Researchers employ the agency theory as the lens, through which managers’ pay arrangement should be 
analyzed when they proposed a quantitative technique that views the performance of firms as the accounting 
measure of firms’ value, and thus investigate its relationship to executive compensation package. Pioneered by Berle 
and Means (1932), issues related to the separation of ownership and control, were raised in the corporate governance 
scheme. Thereafter, great strides in assessing management incentives and the performance of firms were made 
T 
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possible by the use of statistical tests. Several studies on the pay-performance sensitivity then laid the foundation for 
an in-depth empirical investigation on the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance.  
Jensen and Murphy (1990) contend that CEOs compare their personal profits and costs when undertaking particular 
investments. More explicitly, the separation of ownership and control carries the disadvantage of firms’ owners to 
lack a straight influence on companies; which in turn, opens door to the possibility for firms’ executives to pursue 
their own interests. In the same line of reasoning, Yurtoglu and Haid (2005) argue that a large number of 
shareholders create an atmosphere where managers’ goals may deviate from shareholders’ best interests because 
dispersed ownership limits the possibility for firms’ owners to monitor the activities of firms’ executives, and thus 
reduces the possibility for shareholders to put an end to the actions of inefficient firms’ executives. Based on this 
consideration, business and financial models of executive compensation link greater effort to higher pay, and thus tie 
a reward scheme for executives to the performance of firms.  
 
According to Nisenzoun (2003), Jensen and Murphy were the first to quantify the relationship between the 
remuneration of CEOs and the value of shareholders in an article published in 1990. Using CEOs’ salary plus bonus 
as the measure of CEO compensation, Jensen and Murphy found that every thousand dollar change in accounting 
earnings of firms the United States in the years 1974-1986 results in an increase of CEOs’ salary and bonus of less 
than a dollar. The study provides valuable insights on the issue of the statistical and financial importance in 
reference to the pay-performance relationship. The research found the accounting earnings of firms to be statistically 
related to CEOs’ salary and bonus, but rejected its economic importance in the sense that adequate incentives for 
effort would not result in such a low pay-performance relationship. In an attempt to provide a more important 
outcome on the issue of incentives for executives, Jensen and Murphy (1990) redefined CEO compensation in order 
to take into account additional variables in the measure of the wealth of firms’ executives. The permanent increase 
in base pay, the stock ownership, the stock options, and the threat of dismissal were included in the definition of 
CEO compensation. The result failed to strengthen the economic validity of the test even though the CEO wealth 
rose to $3.25 for each additional $1,000 increase in accounting earnings of firms. In spite of the inclusion of other 
variants in the definition of executives’ compensation for a more realistic result, the alternative measure of CEO 
total compensation did not provide a convincing illustration of the association between earnings and profits. 
Schaefer (1998) argues that the slender evidence of Jensen and Murphy (1990) is due to an inelegant estimation 
model and claims that it is inappropriate to ignore the effect of other compensation vehicles in the function 
employed to generate executive compensation. Critics in reference to the absence of other explanatory variables in 
the setup of most models of executive compensation thus lead to the consideration of other performance variables in 
the determination of executive compensation.  
 
METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND DATA SOURCES 
 
The principal-agent model of executive compensation views the role of managers (agents) as maximizer of 
the wealth of shareholders (principals) by aligning pay with performance. Empirical evidence demonstrates that 
firms consistently search for reliable performance measures to tie firm performance to managers' best interests. 
According to Ashley and Yang (2004), stock- and equity-based performance measures determine the executive 
compensation package. Whether stock-based performance measures is utilized to stimulate risk-taking actions of 
executives, reward vehicles, such as stock options and restrictive stock are generally employed to remunerate 
managerial actions that produce growth. This paper examines the weight of the variance of the elements of the 
performance measure of firms in their relationship to CEO total compensation. 
 
CEO total compensation = f(performance of firms)  (1)   
 
Theoretical evidence shows that accounting measures of the market value of firms is used to proxy firms’ 
performance in the principal-agent model of executive compensation (Ashley and Yang, 2004). Governing boards of 
large firms thus tend to rely on compensation contracts to tie senior executives’ actions to financial goals of 
stabilizing the growth of firms, so as to avoid the volatility of the market value of firms. In this respect, the change 
in the market value of firms manifests the search for reliable performance measures by the compensation 
committees’ to reward the effort of executives’ actions. The change in CEO total compensation is thus predicted to 
be related to the change in the accounting market value of firms. 
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Change in CEO total compensation = f(change in the market value of firms)  (2)  
 
 In most studies of executive compensation, accounting earnings appear to be an important determinant of 
the performance measure for the chief aim of determining CEO compensation. Some researchers have utilized 
firms’ total profit of firms to proxy the performance measure (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Nisenzoun, 2003). The use 
of the accounting earnings of firms to evaluate the performance measure is supported by the view that the 
maximization of the net worth of firms’ executives is the performance criterion tied to the annual profit. According 
to Ashley and Yang (2004), large firms tend to rely more on stock-based performance measures to reward managers. 
Based on this view, executives’ total compensation is related to stock returns, and firms’ total sales are used as a 
proxy for stock returns. Cheng, et al. (1996) found that managers use alternatives such as cash flows when 
irregularities in earnings are observed. Moreover, Ashley and Yang (2004) contend that earnings generate a 
performance measure that includes noise; consequently, firms possess lesser power to predict future profitability, 
and alternatives, such as cash flows from operations should be included as a performance measure. In the same line 
of reasoning, Barth, et al. (2001) found that current cash flows forecast future cash flows better than earnings in a 
short term period, and Teitelbaum (2003) determined that investors lower expectations of future earnings and focus 
on cash flows resulting from firms’ operations. The obvious argument is that the compensation committee includes 
cash flows to predict future profitability, and thus assigned a certain weight to cash flows in executives’ 
compensation contracts. Total cash flows are thus employed to evaluate the cash flows from operations of firms. 
Researchers also explain executive compensation by employing firms’ total asset value (Schaefer, 1998). It is argued 
that firms with large asset value have more hierarchical level of responsibility and firms’ executives must deal with 
the obligations attached to duties at the different levels of firms; an intense effort of firm’s executives should thus 
result in higher pay. The asset value of firms is thus utilized to evaluate the total assets.  
  
 The strategy crafted by the compensation committee to support the total compensation package of 
executives should relate to earnings, returns, cash flows, and assets. Based on the above reasoning, the empirical 
strategy in the determination of executives’ compensation describes the change in CEO total compensation as a 
function of the change in firms’ total profit, the change in firms’ total sales, the change in firms’ total cash flows 
from operations, and the change in firms’ total asset value.  
 
Change in CEO compensation = f(change in earnings, change in returns, change in cash flows, change in assets)  (3)   
 
The change in stock returns and the change in firms’ total asset value are expressed using the growth rate of 
the two variables. Like Baber, et al. (1999), this research utilizes the lagged base salary in order to scale the 
magnitude of the change in CEO total compensation; it is a way to minimize the previous period’s performance on 
the measure of CEO total compensation. Following Ashley and Yang (2004), the change in cash flow and the 
change in earning are deflated by the beginning book value of total equity in order to capture firms’ scale effects. 
Prior research has also demonstrated the need to avoid potential bias and eliminate the presence of outliers through 
the use of the percentage change of the values of the original variables. This technique in statistical modeling is 
mostly used to correct problems associated with skewed data, non stable variance, and non linear relationship. All 
the variables are thus expressed in percentage change of the numerical values of the original variables in two 
consecutive years in order to squeeze together larger values and stretch out smaller values.  
 
The statistical technique used necessitates an empirical evaluation in light of the stepwise multiple 
regression. This procedure involves a regression in steps that compares the variables for the chief aim of assessing 
the importance of the independent variables. More specifically, this procedure shows the weight of the variance in 
the change in CEO total compensation that can be accounted for by the change in returns, the change in cash flows, 
the change in earnings, and the change in assets. The empirical measure requires a four-bloc regression analysis 
technique, which reflects the four independent variables. The model departs from the least important determinants to 
arrive at the most important one on the basis of the weight of the variance of each independent variable. The setup of 
the regression is so that the change in returns, the change in cash flows, the change in earnings, and the change in 
assets are eliminated at each level of the regression model. The study yields a breakdown of the total variance in 
four sets of regression equations and shows more specifically the weight of the variance in CEO total compensation 
that can be accounted for by each of the independent variable.  
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – February, 2011 Volume 9, Number 2 
124 © 2011 The Clute Institute 
At the lower level (level one), the regression equation relates CEO total compensation to the four 
independent variables. At this level, the model expresses the weight of the variance in CEO compensation that can 
be accounted for by the change in returns, the change in cash flows, the change in earnings, and the change in assets. 
The explicative variables are then eliminated at each step of the regression equation to arrive at a most parsimonious 
model. At the higher level (level four), the regression equation associates the CEO total compensation only with the 
variable that possesses the strongest weight, which is measured by its total variance in the model. At the base level 
(level one), CEO total compensation is predicted as a function of a linear combination of the change in returns, the 
change in cash flows, the change in earnings, and the change in assets through the following equation: 
 
Level 1 
 
CEO total compensation = α + βX 1  +  X 2  + λX 3 + γ X 4  +   (4)  
 
The parameter α represents the intercept; like the indexes 1, 2, 3, and 4, the parameters β, , λ, and γ are 
associated with either of the following variables: change in returns, change in cash flows, change in earnings, or 
change in assets, and the parameter   refers to the standard error term. The subsequent levels (level 2 to 4) exclude 
the independent variable based on their unimportance in the CEO compensation model and analyze the weight of the 
variance of CEO compensation that can be accounted for by the remaining independent variables. A simple 
statistical model for estimating the subsequent model of the stepwise multiple regression expressed the CEO total 
compensation equation as a function of the remaining variables in the following order: 
 
Level 2  
 
CEO total compensation = α +  X 2  + λX 3 + γ X 4  +   (5)  
 
Level 3 
 
CEO total compensation = α + λX 3 + γ X 4  +   (6)  
 
Level 4 
 
CEO total compensation = α + γ X 4  +   (7) 
 
Delving into equations (4), (5), (6), and (7) to explore their practicability, the model commences with the 
utilization of four sets of explicative variables, the variable with the least weight in total variance is then eliminated 
at each level of the regression model to finally arrive at the most parsimonious equation composed of the variable 
with the strongest weight, measured by its total variance in the CEO total compensation model. The stepwise 
multiple regression is employed as a way to explicitly estimates the independent variables; this technique is meant to 
avoid a misrepresentation of the relationship among the predictors at the CEO total compensation level. The desire 
to use the stepwise multiple regression is motivated by the possibility to remove possible distortions in the 
regression weight of the estimates; it is a technique to eliminate the bias in the estimates for standard errors of the 
mean. 
 
Recall that the main purpose of the multi level model is not to depict the parameters of the observable 
variables of CEO total compensation, but to distinguish between the weights of the variance of the independent 
variables in the determination of the performance measure of CEO total compensation. It is noteworthy that the 
coefficients β,  , λ, and γ are positive if the changes in the monetary benefits attached to the CEO position gets 
higher as the change in returns, the change in cash flows, the change in earnings, and the change in assets increase. 
Although the focus is on the variance of the elements able to significantly impact the remuneration of CEOs, 
attention is also given to the positive or negative nature of the relationship between CEO total compensation and its 
determinants. Statistically, this encompassing approach is aimed to guide policy makers, and help scholars prevent 
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erroneous inference when debating on issues related to CEO compensation. 
 
Secondary data on CEOs’ salary and the book value of total equity for the year 2007, so as CEO total 
compensation, firms’ total profit, firms’ total sales, firms’ total cash flows from operations, and firms’ total asset 
values for the two consecutive years 2007 and 2008 are essential components of the groundwork for the empirical 
testing of the theoretical analysis. Mergent and Hoover are two detailed and comprehensive data source used in this 
research. Both publications report business, financial, and marketing figures of firms of the United States. Similar to 
Mergent, Hoover is a broad database that publishes statistical data on business, financial, and marketing information 
of firms. Unlike Hoover, Mergent tracks extensive data on private and public companies in a lot of countries. In the 
Hoover’s source, financial, marketing, and business information of each company are disclosed in a file, and the 
researcher has to look into a big document for the information needed. Whether the Mergent’s database is utilized in 
this research to extract the fortune 500 firms, which serves as the main source of the investigation in the 
determination of the performance measure of CEO total compensation, the Hoover’s database is employed to extract 
the accounting business and financial information of large publicly held companies. A pool of 103 firms from the 
Fortune 500 firms of the United States appears to have complete information needed in order to perform the 
empirical analysis. The non selection of the other firms is due to incomplete information, mostly related to data on 
CEO total compensation. 
 
The analysis adopts the exceptional convention of shifting the focus on the amount of the financial 
variables in a time period of the year 2008. CEO total compensation is the reported short-term and long-term 
components of executive compensation, which include the base salary, the annual bonus, the stock options, and the 
long-term incentive plans. The cash flows from operations include short term investments that can be rapidly 
converted into cash. As the measure of returns, the revenue is the total sales generated from operations. The firms’ 
total assets value is evaluated as the current assets plus the non-current assets; they comprise both assets that can be 
converted into cash within a year and those that are not allocated to net fixed assets. The book value of total equity is 
computed as the addition of the preferred stock equity to the common stock equity; it is the residual value of the firm 
after all the liabilities have been deducted. As the measure of earnings, the firms’ total profit is employed; it is the 
total net income after accounting for all business actions such as income taken after taxes. 
  
Test Results  
 
Descriptive statistics (the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum, the first quartile, the median, the 
third quartile, the maximum, and the number of observations of the sample firms of the United States for the year 
2008 are provided in the table below: 
 
 
Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 Salary Total Compensation Returns Cash flows Earnings Assets 
Mean 1058390 8530533 16660665050 3604765050 547191260 41448500970 
Standard 
Deviation 
412217 6502854 4062310 1356760 2937855680 1373150 
Minimum 100000 790600 497000000 800000 -13402000000 732400000 
Lower 
Quartile 
854167 3722320 5517300000 253900000 -8000000 4415800000 
Median 1007692 6676874 7695000000 682000000 305400000 11861000000 
Upper 
Quartile 
1127597 11964632 15849000000 2277000000 1215000000 32686000000 
Maximum 2769365 33386016 405607000000 116016000000 13400000000 1309639000000 
Sample Size 103 103 103 103 103 103 
 
 
Values of the mean and the standard deviation of all variables reveal substantial differences across levels of 
total compensation, returns, cash flows, earnings, and assets. Negative values of the minimum and the lower quartile 
of the earning variable associated with positive values of the minimum and the lower quartile of the total 
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compensation variable deliver a message inconsistent with the earnings’ enhancing effect of CEO compensation. 
Based on the pay-performance relationship, a compensation system that rewards executives if a certain quota is met 
should be able to penalize executives if firms do not realize profits. This result translates into the extraction by 
CEOs of certain amount of benefits even when firms are losing money. In this prospect, it is apparent that the lack of 
a relationship between CEO total compensation and firms’ earnings opens door to further investigation. The spread 
of data around the mean (coefficient of variation) and the spread within data (quartile coefficient of dispersion) may 
be useful tools for further analysis of the observations. The coefficient of variation (C v ) and the quartile coefficient 
of dispersion (QCD) are both appropriate tools for data analysis since they describe respectively the variation in the 
magnitude sample values and the dispersion within data. The coefficient of variation is estimated as: 
C v  = 


     (8) 
C v  represents the coefficient of variation,   stands for the standard error of the mean, and   denotes the mean 
value of the variables. As an index of the relative internal variability, the measure of dispersion is used to gauge 
scatter; the smaller the coefficient of variation, the more equitable the statistic distribution of data; in other words, 
the higher the coefficient of variation, the more dispersed the data. An alternative way to analyze the data is through 
the quartile coefficient of dispersion, which is given by the formula below: 
 
 QCD = 
ileFirstQuartileThirdQuart
ileFirstQuartileThirdQuart


   (9) 
 
In the above equation, the expressions “FirstQuartile” and “Thirdquartile” represent respectively the lower 
and the upper quartiles provided by the descriptive statistics. Using formula (8) and (9), computation of data from 
table one summarizes the variability and the dispersion of the variables salary, total compensation, returns, cash 
flows, earnings and assets whose results are given in the table below: 
 
 
Table 2 
Variation and dispersion of data 
 Salary Total Compensation Returns Cash flows Earnings Assets 
Spread around mean 0.39 0.76 0.00002 0.00004 5.37 0.000003 
spread within data 0.14 0.53 0.48 0.80 1.01 0.76 
 
 
Values of the above table translate into dataset with minimal variation and dispersion. With respect to the 
position of the variables relative to the mean, the dataset displays values bunched around the mean, except for the 
earnings variable that reveals noticeable variability. With respect to the spread within data, the earnings variable 
shows a dispersed distribution. Abstracting from other variables, it can be argued that huge fluctuations in earnings 
characterize large firms of the United States. A focus on the total compensation and the earnings variables when the 
other variables are not taken into consideration infers that CEOs’ pay tend not to be in line with CEOs’ contribution 
to the performance of firms, which contradicts the logic governing the pay-performance relationship that greater 
effort leads to higher pay.  The following table depicts the relationship between the explained and the explicative 
variables; it also provides a summary of the coefficients in their levels (one, two, three, and four) of the stepwise 
multiple regression in a more precise manner.  
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Table 3 
Regression results 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable (Change in CEO total Compensation) 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Change in Assets 0.26 (2.39) [0.02] 0.26 (2.54) [0.01] 0.26 (2.71) [0.08] 0.26 (2.70) [0.08] 
Change in Earnings -0.04 (-0.38) [0.70] -0.04 (-0.37) [0.71] -0.04 (-0.36) [0.72]  
Change in Returns 0.02 (0.18)  [0.86] 0.02 (0.16) [0.88]   
Change in Cash Flows 0.01 (0.10) [0.92]    
Summary Statistics (Weight of the independent variables at the different levels)  
Adjusted R
2
 
0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 
R
2
 change 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F 1.81[0.13] 2.44[0.07] 3.68[0.03] 7.30[0.01] 
F change 1.81 0.01 0.03 1.13 
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent t-statistics and values enclosed in brackets denote probabilities. 
 
 
An important feature of the regression results provided by the above table is given by the identification of 
the variables X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , and X 4 . The link running from the change in the market value of firm to the change in 
CEO total compensation regards X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , and X 4  as the representation of change in cash flows, change in 
returns, change in earnings, and change in assets respectively. Whether the variable with the lesser weight in total 
variance in the CEO compensation equation is identified as the total cash flows from operations, the variable with 
the strongest weight in total variance represents the firm total asset value. A blinker view in the above table reveals 
that the R
2
 change remains constant at all level of the CEO total compensation model as the variables with the 
minimal weights in variance are gradually eliminated in subsequent models. A move from the base to the subsequent 
models of the regression equations shows a one percent increase in the value of the adjusted R
2
 at each level of the 
CEO compensation equation. It commences with a value of 3% in the base model to arrive at a most parsimonious 
model with the explanatory power of the assets variable reaching a peak at 6%. In light of the values of the adjusted 
R
2
, the empirical reasoning suggests a very poor fit of the explanatory power of the independent variables.  
 
Turning to the F-statistic, the fit of the estimated base model (level 1) appears insignificant at the 10% level 
of significance. The F-statistic of the base model reveals an F-value of 1.81 with the associated p-value of 0.13; this 
clearly indicates that the regression of the base model is not significant at the conventional level of significance. 
Based on the F-values of the estimated models, the empirical reasoning suggests the base model to be dropped from 
the analysis since it does not meet the requirements for comments. The F-value of the base model thus provide 
support to the argument that the cash flows from operations is not considered as a variable able to impact the 
performance measure in the determination of CEO total compensation. The F-values of the regression equations of 
the subsequent models of the CEO total compensation model display important patterns of 7%, 3%, and 1% level of 
significance; these F-values of the subsequent levels seems statistically well suited at the 10% level of significance. 
The regression results thus confer the greatest benefit in the exploration of performance criteria, such as returns, 
earnings, and assets, specified in CEO compensation contracts.  
 
The estimated results provide arguments that run counter to the theory of executive compensation specified 
in compensation contracts and unease the financial logic of the pay-performance relationship. Cash flows as a 
performance measure is not in sync with returns, earnings, and assets in the determination of executive 
compensation. Recall that the financial literature stresses on the ability of current cash flows to predict future cash 
flows better than current aggregate earnings in a short term period. The estimated result systematically contradicts 
the argument of Barth, et al. (2001) that a certain weight is assigned to cash flows from operations in the executives’ 
compensation contract. The estimated pay-performance relationship is in line with the argument of Perel (2003) that 
the empirical evidence presents no rational basis able to explain higher executive compensation. The empirical 
results also show support to the reasoning of Nisenzoun (2003) that CEO compensation is not consistent with the 
overall performance of firms. This result also validates the public perception that CEO compensation is out of 
control. 
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After the variable cash flows is excluded from the regression equation, the model acknowledges the 
variables returns and earnings in the model at the CEO total compensation level. In light of the F-values of 
respectively 7% and 3% level of significance, these two variables appear to be important determinants of CEO total 
compensation. However, the financial validity of the CEO compensation enhancing effects of returns and earnings 
seems to be distorted by the insignificant negative value of the earnings variable coupled with the insignificant 
positive value of the returns variable. The regression equations consider returns and earnings variables to be 
determinants with lesser weight in total variances in the CEO total compensation model. Moreover, the returns and 
earnings variables display a statistical t-value of respectively 12% and 28% confidence level in the determination of 
CEO total compensation; they are insignificant at the 10% level of significance. More explicitly, the earnings and 
returns variables are not statistically different from zero in the in the determination of CEO compensation contracts. 
Although these two variables are useful in the determination of CEO total compensation, their weights measured in 
total variance appear very weak driving the two variables to be insignificant at the conventional level of 
significance.  
 
At the highest level, the model composed of the total assets as the only independent variable indicates 
statistically significant F-value of 1% level of significance. The statistical result reveals that the link running from 
firms’ total asset value to CEO total compensation is statistically strong. This empirical result provides support to 
the idea that the total assets value is particularly sensitive in the determination of CEO total compensation. The 
quantitative assessment of the causality relationship between CEO total compensation and firms’ total asset value is 
also analyzed through the evaluation of the t-statistic. With t-statistic values of 2.70 and the associated probabilities 
of 8% level of significance, the assets variable is significant at the 92% confidence level. The value of 0.26, which 
determine the reaction of the change in CEO total compensation to a variation in the change of firms’ total assets 
value translate into a positive influence of the reaction of CEO total compensation to an increase in firms’ assets. 
More precisely, the model predicts an increase of CEO total compensation of 2.6% for every 10% increase in firms’ 
total assets value. This result provide a strong support to the argument of Schaefer (1998) that the total asset value of 
firms is the main determinants of CEO compensation; it also explicitly ascertains a viewpoint conforms to the 
financial reality that CEO compensation should be linked to duties attached to CEOs’ position in firms. 
 
The objective of this research is to perform a quantitative study that tests the determinants of executive 
compensation under the criteria of the performance measure. The research investigates whether the compensation 
committee relies on the accounting measure of firms’ value when designing executive compensation contracts. The 
research deeply looks into the weights of the variance of the change in cash flows, the change in returns, the change 
in earnings, and the change in assets in the accounting performance criteria of CEO total compensation. Basically, 
the investigation relates the total compensation package of executives to firms’ total profit, firms’ total sales, firms’ 
total cash flows from operations, and firms’ total asset value.  In the process of answering the above questions, an 
additional discovery is made that lends itself to the ineffectiveness of the emphasis that investors placed on cash 
generated by firms’ operations on CEO total compensation. It appears that discounting promises on future earnings 
through cash generated by firms’ operations has any influence on the determination of CEO total compensation. 
This discovery comes with an in-depth understanding of a broad definition of the accounting determinants of 
executive total compensation.  
 
Specifically, cash flows is not aligned with returns, earnings, and assets in the determination of executive 
compensation measure because the quantitative assessment of the causality relationship between CEO compensation 
and firm performance ignores the potential influence of the cash flows variable in the determination of CEO 
compensation.  Even though returns and earnings are considered important elements in the determination of CEO 
total compensation, their insignificant effect deliver a message inconsistent with the economic reality since 
executive compensation should be aligned with the accounting measures of returns and earnings variables. Only the 
change in total asset value appears to be positive and statistically significant. The regression results reveal an 
increase in total asset value of a little more than a quarter of percentage point for every one percent increase in CEO 
total compensation. Even though the strong positive influence of the change in total asset of firms on CEO total 
compensation seems appropriate, the silent nature of returns and earnings translate into the general idea that 
compensation committees do not exhibit a willingness to adapt to the current market situation marked by the public 
constant grief about excessive executive compensation. Management actions do not result in successful performance 
of firms because of the distorted relationship between the actions of firms’ executives and the corporate goals. It is 
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absurd that the change in firms’ total assets value by itself explains the change in executive compensation package. 
Compensation committees should definitely move beyond firms’ total assets value and assigns a certain weight to 
alternative performance measure (earnings, returns, and cash flows) in the determination of executive compensation.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The agency theory suggests that firms interested in ensuring that corporate executives act in the 
shareholders’ best interest should design compensation policies that tie the remuneration of firms’ executives to the 
performance of organizations. The effectiveness to link executive compensation to the market value of firms is 
designed by estimating the magnitude that the change in accounting measures of cash flows, returns, earnings and 
assets exert on the change in CEO total compensation. The assessment of the non alignment of performance criteria 
defined in executive compensation contracts is evaluated using the stepwise multiple regression, which statistically 
weights the variances of the independent variables against each other. Inconsistent with the financial logic that tie 
the executive welfare to the accounting criteria of performance measures, the empirical results reveal the exclusion 
of cash flows as determinant of executive compensation; earnings and returns are considered as determinants of 
executive compensation; however, the insignificant nature of both variables delivers a message to policy makers in 
reference to a reexamination of executive compensation package. From the empirical standpoint, the link running 
from assets to executive compensation is positive and significant. The statistical results finally support the idea that 
it is only the firms’ total asset value that plays an important role in the determination of executive compensation. 
The exclusion of cash flows, the zero effects of returns and earnings, and the strong positive influence of assets on 
CEO compensation offer the ability to pinpoint huge discrepancies in executive compensation contracts; it also 
pertains to demonstrate that executive compensation is in need of reforms.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Company Salary Compensation Returns Cash Flows Earnings Assets  
Abbot Laboratories 1795471 28335494 29527600000  5079600000  4880700000 422419200000 
AES Corp 999000 7074009 16070000000 3014000000 1234000000 34086000000 
Avon Products Inc 1375000 11055012 10690100000 1114800000 875300000 6074000000 
Baker Hughes Inc 1155000 12710093 11864000000 1955000000 1635000000 11861000000 
Bank of NY Mellon 993750 13288556 16339000000 116016000000 1419000000 237512000000 
Black & Decker  1500000 13653766 6086100000 277800000 293600000 5183300000 
Bristol-Myers  1488077 25037768 20597000000 8265000000 5247000000 29552000000 
Burlington N.S.F. 1183583 15608233 18018000000 633000000 2115000000 36403000000 
Comcast Corp 2769365 23728548 34256000000 1254000000 2547000000 113017000000 
El Paso Corp 1037505 6456445 5363000000 1900000000 -823000000 23668000000 
EMC     Corp 1000000 12791608 14876200000 6807000000 1345600000 23874600000 
Exelon  Corp 1474423 9063496 18859000000 1756000000 2737000000 47817000000 
Dow Chemicals 1641667 16182544 57514000000 2800000000 579000000 45474000000 
Lowe’s Company 1100000 7876339 48230000000 661000000 2195000000 32686000000 
Merck & Co   1783334 19906430 23850300000 5486400000 7808400000 47195700000 
Pepsi Co     1300000 13382035 43251000000 2277000000 5142000000 35994000000 
Pfizer       1575000 13102886 48296000000 24555000000 8104000000 111148000000 
Texas Instruments 963120 9394073 12501000000 2540000000 1920000000 11923000000 
Time Warner  1750000 19850350 46984000000 6682000000 -13402000000 113896000000 
United Tech  1318974 18009832 58681000000 4327000000 4689000000 56469000000 
Wal-Mart Stores 1050000 12238209 405607000000 7275000000 13400000000 163429000000 
Wells Fargo & Co 878920 13782433 52389000000 73196000000 2655000000 1309639000000 
Ameren Corp  935000 5046122 7839000000 299000000 605000000 22657000000 
Arrows Electro 1100000 7060468 16761000000 451300000 -613700000 7118300000 
Avery Dennison 945000 5831997 6701400000 105500000 266100000 6035700000 
BJ’s Wholesale 675000 2623994 10027400000 51200000 134600000 2021400000 
Bluelinx Holdings 473077 1718243 2779700000 150400000 -31700000 732400000 
Brinks Company 1101875 7683903 3163500000 250900000 183300000 1815800000 
Broadcom Corp 679250 10822937 4658100000 1898100000 214800000 4393300000 
Brunswick Corp 888577 3137801 4708700000 317500000 -788100000 3223900000 
Celanese Corp 900000 4831995 6823000000 682000000 282000000 7166000000 
Chubb Corp   1275000 16823602 13221000000 2534000000 1804000000 48429000000 
CIT Group    800000 5422150 6098500000 8990100000 -2799500000 80448900000 
Comcast Corp 2769365 23728548 34256000000 1254000000 2547000000 113017000000 
Con Way Inc  700378 3176566 5036800000 278300000 73800000 3071700000 
Consolidated Ed 1102500 7318517 13583000000 236000000 1196000000 33498000000 
Crosstex Energy 435000 2023684 497000000 41100000 24200000 2206700000 
CSX Corp     1058000 12373346 11250000000 745000000 1365000000 26288000000 
Eastman Chemical 1131154 6237656 6726000000 387000000 346000000 5281000000 
Edison Int’l 892485 4213436 14112000000 4496000000 1215000000 44615000000 
Emcor Group  950000 6365864 6785200000 405900000 182200000 3008400000 
Fith Third Banc 899995 3132787 8640000000 6317000000 -2113000000 119764000000 
FMC Technologies 891667 14546395 4550900000 694700000 361300000 3586300000 
Fortune Brands 1100000 4170781 7608900000 163300000 311100000 12091900000 
Freeport-McRowen  2500000 33386016 17796000000 872000000 -11067000000 23353000000 
Gannett Co   1166667 3135469 6767600000 98900000 -6647600000 7796800000 
General Cable  823270 3710620 6230100000 291300000 217200000 3840400000 
Genuine Parts Co 875000 4671434 11015300000 67800000 475400000 4786400000 
Hanover Insurance 888461 4021159 2680400000 416900000 20600000 9230200000 
Holly Corp   849782 3541910 5867700000 90000000 120600000 1874200000 
Host Hotels & Re 750000 1682549 5288000000 552000000 427000000 11951000000 
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Interpublic Group 1332500 10843080 6962700000 2325800000 295000000 12125200000 
KB Home      1000000 9624932 3033900000 1250800000 -976100000 4044300000 
Kelly Services 917500 2035324 5517300000 118300000 -82200000 1457300000 
Key Corp     1019538 4860595 6658000000 7758000000 -1468000000 104531000000 
Level 3 Com  812692 5819886 4301000000 771000000 -290000000 9638000000 
Lexmark Int’l 1007692 4246155 4528400000 973300000 240200000 3265400000 
Eli Lilly & Co 1339125 12978215 20378000000 5926100000 -2071900000 29212600000 
Loews Corp   1100000 7020135 14543000000 6160000000 4530000000 69857000000 
MDC Holdings Inc 1000000 9334163 1458100000 1360300000 -380500000 2474900000 
Manitowoc Co 700000 4751527 4503000000 180700000 -10700000 6065400000 
Masco Corp   934616 5516905 9600000000 1028000000 -391000000 9483000000 
Mirant Corp  1127597 8637563 3188000000 4617000000 1265000000 10688000000 
Mohawk Industries 980000 1707822 6826400000 93500000 -1458200000 6446200000 
Murphy Oil Corp 470833 2180163 27512500000 1086400000 1740000000 11149100000 
Nash-Finch Co 852937 5001958 4703700000 800000 36200000 955000000 
Newell Rubbermaid 1291667 5903527 6470600000 275400000 -52300000 6792500000 
Newmont Mining  100000 5819737 6199000000 447000000 853000000 15839000000 
Ni Source    791667 2664531 3242600000 307200000 79000000 20032200000 
Office Depot 1000000 9361424 14495500000 155700000 -1478900000 5268200000 
OGE Energy Corp 775000 3894891 4070700000 174400000 231400000 6518500000 
Old Republic Int 776146 880526 3237700000 951900000 -558300000 13266000000 
Omnicom Group Inc1000000 2953384 13359900000 1112400000 1000300000 17318400000 
Owens & Minor Inc 788077 3595104 7243200000 7900000 93300000 1776200000 
Peabody Energy  1053750 11950858 6593400000 449700000 953500000 9822400000 
JC Penney Co 1500000 10023947 18846000000 2352000000 572000000 12011000000 
Pepco Holdings 659375 2115469 10700000000 492000000 300000000 16475000000 
Perini Corp  493550 790600 5660300000 386300000 -75100000 3073100000 
PG & E Corp  1090833 13371479 14628000000 1342000000 1199000000 40537000000 
PPG Industries 1041667 8823450 15849000000 1045000000 538000000 14698000000 
PPL Corp     1141106 6676874 8044000000 1570000000 930000000 21405000000 
Qwest Diagnostics 1143868 11964632 7249500000 253900000 581500000 8403800000 
Qwest Comm   1200000 10432615 13475000000 565000000 681000000 20182000000 
CH Robinson World 400000 2784393 8578600000 497400000 359200000 1815700000 
Ross Stores Inc 1031238 8208732 6486100000 322100000 305400000 2355500000 
Ryder System Inc 895000 4696052 6203700000 152800000 199900000 6689500000 
Saks Inc     1060000 3099006 3029700000 10300000 -154900000 2165000000 
Scana Corp   1094985 6821202 5319000000 272000000 346000000 11502000000 
Henry Schein Inc 1123462 3722320 6394900000 374900000 243100000 3599600000 
Sempra Energy 1143957 11979186 10758000000 694000000 1113000000 26400000000 
Sherwin Williams  1214590 6203510 7979700000 26200000 476900000 4415800000 
Southwest Airlines 441121 1680272 11023000000 1803000000 178000000 14308000000 
Staples Inc  1112000 8377420 23083800000 633800000 805300000 13006000000 
Temple Inland Inc 774538 1905417 3884000000 41000000 -8000000 5869000000 
Gap Inc      1500000 9329170 14526000000 1756000000 967000000 7564000000 
Timken Co    1018840 5740669 5663700000 116300000 267700000 4536000000 
Travel Centers 300000 1727440 7658400000 145500000 -40200000 889800000 
UAL Corp     850000 6471062 20194000000 3046000000 -5348000000 19461000000 
Union Pacific  1141667 7428212 17970000000 1249000000 2338000000 39722000000 
Universal American 857444 3503702 4659200000 511000000 95100000 3870700000 
Wesco Int’l  854167 4619395 6110800000 86300000 212700000 2721000000 
Wisconsin Energy 1129008 9875302 4431000000 246600000 359100000 12617800000 
XTO Energy   941674 29722888 7695000000 2760000000 1912000000 38254000000 
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DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Salary TotalCompensation returns CashFlows Earnings Assets   
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX. 
 
Descriptives 
 
Notes 
Output Created 14-May-2009 20:15:37 
Comments  
Input Data E:\ceodata.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 103 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used All non-missing data are used. 
Syntax DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Salary 
TotalCompensation returns CashFlows 
Earnings Assets 
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX. 
 
Resources Processor Time 0:00:00.000 
Elapsed Time 0:00:00.000 
 
 
[DataSet1] E:\ceodata.sav 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Salary 103 100000 2769365 1058389.50 412216.857 
Total Compensation 103 790600 33386016 8530533.29 6502853.978 
returns 103 4970.00 4056070.00 166606.6505 4.06231E5 
CashFlows 103 8.00 1160160.00 36047.6505 1.35676E5 
Earnings 103 -134020.00 134000.00 5471.9126 29378.55680 
Assets 103 7324.00 13096390.00 414485.0097 1.37315E6 
Valid N (listwise) 103     
Note: For ease of data reading, the variables Returns, Cash flow, Earning and Asset are divided by 100000   
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REGRESSION   /MISSING LISTWISE   /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE   
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)   /NOORIGIN   /DEPENDENT ChangeCompensation   
/METHOD=BACKWARD ChangeInReturn ChangeInCashFlow ChangeInEarning ChangeInAsset. 
 
Regression 
 
Notes 
Output Created 11-May-2009 22:27:36 
Comments  
Input Data E:\ceodata1.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet0 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 103 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on cases with no missing values 
for any variable used. 
Syntax REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA 
COLLIN TOL CHANGE 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT ChangeCompensation 
  /METHOD=BACKWARD ChangeInReturn 
ChangeInCashFlow ChangeInEarning 
ChangeInAsset. 
Resources Processor Time 0:00:00.078 
Elapsed Time 0:00:00.078 
Memory Required 2628 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet0] E:\ceodata1.sav 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 ChangeInAsset, ChangeInEarning, 
ChangeInReturn, 
ChangeInCashFlowa 
. Enter 
2 . ChangeInCashFlow Backward (criterion: Probability 
of F-to-remove >= .100). 
3 . ChangeInReturn Backward (criterion: Probability 
of F-to-remove >= .100). 
4 . ChangeInEarning Backward (criterion: Probability 
of F-to-remove >= .100). 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: ChangeCompensation 
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Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .263a .069 .031 6.46008 .069 1.814 4 98 .132 
2 .262b .069 .041 6.42768 .000 .009 1 98 .923 
3 .262c .069 .050 6.39627 .000 .025 1 99 .875 
4 .260d .067 .058 6.36869 -.001 .131 1 100 .718 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ChangeInAsset, ChangeInEarning, ChangeInReturn, ChangeInCashFlow 
b. Predictors: (Constant), ChangeInAsset, ChangeInEarning, ChangeInReturn 
c. Predictors: (Constant), ChangeInAsset, ChangeInEarning 
d. Predictors: (Constant), ChangeInAsset 
 
 
ANOVAe 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 302.842 4 75.711 1.814 .132a 
Residual 4089.802 98 41.733   
Total 4392.645 102    
2 Regression 302.450 3 100.817 2.440 .069b 
Residual 4090.195 99 41.315   
Total 4392.645 102    
3 Regression 301.422 2 150.711 3.684 .029c 
Residual 4091.222 100 40.912   
Total 4392.645 102    
4 Regression 296.065 1 296.065 7.299 .008d 
Residual 4096.580 101 40.560   
Total 4392.645 102    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ChangeInAsset, ChangeInEarning, ChangeInReturn, ChangeInCashFlow 
b. Predictors: (Constant), ChangeInAsset, ChangeInEarning, ChangeInReturn 
c. Predictors: (Constant), ChangeInAsset, ChangeInEarning 
d. Predictors: (Constant), ChangeInAsset 
e. Dependent Variable: ChangeCompensation 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -.887 .703  -1.262 .210   
ChangeInReturn .007 .038 .018 .175 .861 .855 1.170 
ChangeInCashFlow .002 .022 .010 .097 .923 .828 1.208 
ChangeInEarning -.005 .013 -.039 -.383 .703 .907 1.102 
ChangeInAsset .067 .028 .256 2.387 .019 .824 1.214 
2 (Constant) -.872 .681  -1.280 .204   
ChangeInReturn .006 .036 .016 .158 .875 .905 1.105 
ChangeInEarning -.005 .012 -.037 -.372 .710 .977 1.023 
ChangeInAsset .068 .027 .259 2.543 .013 .904 1.107 
3 (Constant) -.845 .657  -1.287 .201   
ChangeInEarning -.004 .012 -.035 -.362 .718 .984 1.016 
ChangeInAsset .069 .025 .264 2.714 .008 .984 1.016 
4 (Constant) -.782 .631  -1.241 .218   
ChangeInAsset .068 .025 .260 2.702 .008 1.000 1.000 
a. Dependent Variable: ChangeCompensation 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) ChangeInReturn ChangeInCashFlow ChangeInEarning ChangeInAsset 
1 1 1.523 1.000 .09 .14 .09 .01 .21 
2 1.329 1.071 .16 .04 .11 .30 .01 
3 .999 1.235 .13 .27 .32 .08 .01 
4 .712 1.462 .25 .07 .00 .34 .50 
5 .437 1.866 .37 .48 .47 .28 .27 
2 1 1.458 1.000 .17 .24  .01 .17 
2 1.217 1.094 .16 .03  .44 .12 
3 .716 1.426 .15 .17  .31 .62 
4 .608 1.548 .52 .57  .25 .09 
3 1 1.252 1.000 .37   .36 .00 
2 1.061 1.086 .06   .08 .77 
3 .686 1.351 .56   .56 .23 
4 1 1.101 1.000 .45    .45 
2 .899 1.107 .55    .55 
a. Dependent Variable: ChangeCompensation 
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Excluded Variablesd 
Model Beta In T Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
Minimum 
Tolerance 
2 ChangeInCashFlow .010a .097 .923 .010 .828 1.208 .824 
3 ChangeInCashFlow .006b .057 .954 .006 .877 1.140 .877 
ChangeInReturn .016b .158 .875 .016 .905 1.105 .904 
4 ChangeInCashFlow -.003c -.032 .975 -.003 .932 1.073 .932 
ChangeInReturn .013c .127 .899 .013 .912 1.097 .912 
ChangeInEarning -.035c -.362 .718 -.036 .984 1.016 .984 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), ChangeInAsset, ChangeInEarning, ChangeInReturn 
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), ChangeInAsset, ChangeInEarning 
c. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), ChangeInAsset 
d. Dependent Variable: ChangeCompensation 
 
